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Abstract
Due to its low communication cost, stateful broadcast encryption is an appealing solution for secure content
distribution in mobile ad hoc wireless networks (MANETs). Unfortunately, the inherent limitations of
MANETs prevent a standard application of such schemes since they require receivers to be online. In this
paper, we present a reliable message delivery mechanism for MANETs that is based on erasure codes and
that leverages node mobility in order to achieve non-interactive recovery of missed messages. We then
show how our mechanism can be used to reliably deliver the key updates of a stateful broadcast encryption
scheme. Our solution has several useful properties: it allows trade-oﬀs between the amount of storage
required at each node and the speed of message recovery; and it has the ability to leverage the resources
of unauthorized nodes. We evaluate the performance of our approach through simulation, and show that it
achieves good performance for networks with high node density.
Keywords: reliable message delivery, broadcast encryption, key updates, storage, mobility, wireless ad hoc
wireless networks.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of secure content distribution in mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs), where a single source disseminates data to a dynamically changing
group of authorized receivers. In this context, the source and the receivers are
mobile nodes part of a multihop ad hoc wireless network. A simple way of ensuring
the secrecy of the data (i.e., that only an authorized subset of users be able to
recover it), is for the source to use (at the application layer) a broadcast encryption
scheme to encrypt all messages before transmission. This guarantees that even if
the encrypted data is received by all users, only the authorized subset will be able
to recover the content.
1 Email:crix@cs.jhu.edu
2 Email:seny@cs.jhu.edu
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 171 (2007) 57–69
1571-0661 © 2007 Elsevier B.V.     
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2006.11.009
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Broadcast encryption was ﬁrst introduced by Fiat and Naor [8] and has since
been studied under many variants [19,11,10,27,26]. Typically, broadcast encryption
schemes are classiﬁed as either stateful or stateless. Stateless schemes provide users
with long-term keys that are never changed throughout the lifetime of the system,
while stateful schemes provide keys that may be updated after join or revocation
events. While the former require receivers to be online in order to receive key
update messages, a simple argument shows that after a logarithmic (in the num-
ber of users) number of revocations occur, stateful schemes typically achieve lower
communication cost than stateless schemes (see Appendix A).
The characteristic properties of MANETs, including low bandwidth, lossy links,
and mobility, make deploying broadcast encryption challenging for the following
reasons. The limited bandwidth available in such networks stresses the importance
of minimal communication costs and favors the use of stateful schemes. However, a
standard application of stateful broadcast encryption is not possible since it requires
receivers to be online, which cannot be guaranteed in MANETs since mobility may
cause nodes to become partitioned from the network.
In this work, we propose a reliable message delivery mechanism for MANETs
which guarantees that partitioned nodes can recover lost messages within a rea-
sonable amount of time. Intuitively, we require each node in the network to store
a “piece” of a message, and we leverage node mobility to allow partitioned nodes
to recover missed messages after encountering a speciﬁed number of nodes. Our
mechanism is based on erasure codes and has the advantage of allowing a trade-oﬀ
between message recovery time and node storage.
We then show how to achieve communication eﬃcient secure content distribution
in MANETs using a stateful broadcast encryption scheme provisioned with our
reliable message delivery mechanism. In particular, we use our mechanism to deliver
the scheme’s key updates in a reliable way to each node in the network. We are
thus able to preserve the advantage, in terms of reduced communication cost at
the source, that stateful broadcast encryption schemes oﬀer over stateless schemes.
Besides communication eﬃciency, we note that since our reliability mechanism is
independent of our secure content distribution mechanism (i.e., of the underlying
broadcast encryption scheme), our solution has the ability to leverage the resources
of unauthorized nodes. In other words, the reliability of our content distribution
scheme improves not only with the number of authorized users, but also with the
number of unauthorized users.
2 Related Work
Reliable message delivery can be achieved using interactive or non-interactive means,
depending on whether clients contact the source to retrieve missed messages. In the
ad hoc wireless setting, characterized by a relatively high packet loss and limited
bandwidth, interactive solutions [20,29,31,23] are undesirable because the increased
communication cost can cause packet implosion at the source. Moreover, these inter-
active schemes become problematic if nodes are partitioned and cannot contact the
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center. In order to avoid these scalability and connectivity issues, in this work, we
only consider non-interactive solutions. Some of these interactive solutions [28,29]
use forward error-correcting codes to improve the reliability of multicast rekeying.
In gossip-based reliable multicast protocols [6,16] the members of the multicast
group pro-actively exchange information about the “state” of the group with a set
of other group members, which are selected at random. This allows probabilistic
recovery of missed packets at the cost of increased traﬃc caused by repeated rounds
of gossip message exchanges. Such protocols have not been considered within a
security framework.
Self-healing key distribution, proposed in [25] and improved in [14], can be used
to reliably (and non-interactively) deliver key updates to users. Self-healing schemes
allow users that missed t consecutive updates to recover them if they receive one
update preceding and one update following the t missed updates. Unfortunately,
even for the most eﬃcient self-healing scheme [14] the size of updates is O(t · v),
where v is the size of the largest coalition (of revoked users) the scheme can handle.
And since both t and v must be ﬁxed during system initialization, one will typically
have to choose large values in order to cover the largest period in which consecutive
updates could be missed, and the largest possible coalition of revoked nodes that
may form.
GKMPAN [32,33] provides scalable and eﬃcient mechanisms for group rekey-
ing in ad hoc wireless networks, based on probabilistic key pre-deployment [7,34].
During system setup, nodes are pre-loaded with m symmetric keys chosen out of
a pool of l keys. These keys are later used by neighboring nodes to establish se-
cure channels. When an addition or revocation event occurs, the group manager
generates an intermediate key and propagates it through the network. Nodes use
this intermediate key to update both the group key and the keys they share with
any revoked node. Since, with high probability, any two nodes will store at least
one key in common, a partitioned node will likely be able to recover missed up-
dates from its neighbors. This work comes closest to ours since nodes that miss
update messages (e.g., due to lossy links or network partitions) are able to recover
the new group key mostly through local interactions (with low probability a node
might need to contact the key manager). This partial statelessness feature makes
GKMPAN attractive for use in MANETs, especially since rekeying has a small per
node transmission cost.
While GKMPAN has several desirable features, the approach we take in this
work achieves new and useful properties. For instance, since our reliability mech-
anism is independent of our secure content distribution mechanism (i.e., of the
underlying broadcast encryption scheme), we can leverage the resources of nodes
that are not authorized group members. Our system also allows partitioned nodes
to recover any arbitrary (but ﬁxed) number of missed messages with certainty, while
GKMPAN only provides a probabilistic guarantee. In addition, since GKMPAN re-
quires all connected nodes to erase the intermediate key after they update the group
key and their compromised keys, a partitioned node that rejoins the network after
a missed rekey message will never be able to update its compromised keys. As a
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consequence, the probability that it shares a key with its neighbors (and that it can
establish a secure channel to recover the missed update) will decrease as the number
of missed messages increases. Finally, we do not assume that node compromises are
detected within a bounded period of time.
3 Preliminaries
Network and security model.
This work relies on several network and security assumptions. The receivers in
a broadcast encryption scheme are nodes in a mobile ad hoc network. In addition
to nodes in the subset of authorized receivers, the network may also contain non-
authorized nodes, which may oﬀer their services to improve the quality of the content
distribution service. If an authorized receiver is compromised, the attacker will
obtain its credentials, and will be able to decrypt the broadcast content until the
compromise has been detected.
We assume the existence of a network layer mechanism (e.g., a multicast routing
protocol [22,9]) that ensures eﬃcient message delivery from the center to a speciﬁed
group of nodes in the ad hoc network. We also assume that the communication
and computational capabilities of a node are limited, but that it has relatively large
storage capabilities (e.g., a PDA can store up to several MBytes).
Erasure codes.
An erasure code [21,15,3] is a pair of (possibly) probabilistic algorithms C =
(Encode,Decode). A sender uses the Encode algorithm to encode a message m,
composed of  symbols, into a codeword c, composed of λ symbols. We say that C
has minimum distance d if it can tolerate up to d− 1 erasures, or in other words, if
the receiver can recover m from any λ− d + 1 symbols of c. The rate of a code is
the value ρ = 
λ
, and we say that C is a (λ, , d)-erasure code if it encodes a message
of  symbols into a codeword of λ symbols, and has minimum distance d. Note
that symbols can be any “unit” of data (e.g., packets or bits), but when applying
our construction to broadcast encryption, we will assume symbols are blocks of a
speciﬁed bit length (see Section 5 for details).
For several examples of erasure codes, encoding and decoding can be done eﬃ-
ciently. In particular, Reed-Solomon [21] codes can be encoded and decoded in time
O(λ2), and Tornado codes [15] in time O(λ) (though Tornado codes only guarantee
that messages are recovered with high probability).
Finally, we note that erasure codes are vulnerable to pollution attacks, which
are denial of service attacks where an adversary introduces invalid symbols into the
decoding process. Such attacks, however, can be mitigated by using distillation
codes [13] at the cost of increased computational and communication overhead.
Broadcast encryption.
We use interchangeably the terms source and center to refer to the source that
disseminates the content. Similarly, we interchangeably denote the users that receive
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content as users or receivers. Users are either authorized (i.e., are non-revoked and
are allowed to access the content) or revoked. We use revoked users as a generic
term to denote users that are not allowed to access the content. We use N to denote
the set of users in the system, G ⊆ N for the set of authorized users and R = N\G
for the set of revoked users. Let n = |N| and r = n− |G|.
Let BE = (GBE, EBE
G
,DBE
G
) be a stateful broadcast encryption scheme and (G, E ,D)
be a symmetric encryption scheme. Users share long-term keys with the center. A
broadcast encryption scheme encrypts each message with a session key and then
encrypts the session key such that only non-revoked users are able to decrypt it
based on their long-term keys. Speciﬁcally, for a message m the center broadcasts
[EBE
G
(K), EK(m)], where K is the session key and E
BE
G
(K) is the header that encap-
sulates the session key. When comparing the communication cost of a broadcast
encryption scheme, we usually refer to the size of this header.
4 Reliable Message Delivery
In mobile ad hoc networks nodes often miss broadcast messages due to network
partitions or lossy links. A reliable message delivery mechanism enables a source to
deliver messages to all the nodes in a MANET in a reliable way. We will mainly be
interested in three aspects of such a mechanism: scalability, storage per node, and
recovery time. We loosely deﬁne scalability as the mechanism’s ability to handle
large network sizes, and recovery time as the number of nodes a rejoining node needs
to encounter in order to recover a missed message. We begin by reviewing two basic
approaches to reliable message delivery and point out their limitations in terms
of scalability and storage requirements. We then present our preferred mechanism
which is highly scalable and allows a trade-oﬀ between storage and recovery time
(i.e., the number of encounters needed).
An interactive approach.
A trivial reliable delivery mechanism can be constructed as follows. The content
distribution source stores each message it sends. When a node that missed a message
(either because it was partitioned or because it was oﬀ-line) rejoins the network,
it simply asks the source for the messages it missed. This interactive solution
is clearly not scalable as the source might be overwhelmed with message requests
when the network size is large. It is also problematic because the node might not be
able to directly communicate with the source (e.g., it might be out of the source’s
transmission range) and re-transmission might have to be relayed through other
nodes, which would contribute to an increase in overall network traﬃc.
A (naive) non-interactive approach.
A naive non-interactive solution would be to require each node that receives a
message from the source to store it. When a node that missed a message rejoins
the network, it can ask any node that was connected during the broadcast for the
missed message. This approach achieves optimal recovery time since disconnected
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nodes need only encounter a single node in order to recover a message. On the other
hand, it requires a large amount of storage per node since each node will have to
store r · q bits, where r is the number of messages broadcast by the source, and q is
the size of each message.
4.1 Our Approach
We propose a non-interactive solution, but provide a method that requires nodes to
store less than the naive non-interactive scheme. The cost paid is that disconnected
nodes need to encounter more than one node in order to recover the messages they
missed. Since nodes are mobile, the rejoining nodes will encounter other nodes, so
it seems reasonable to trade storage size for recovery time.
Informally, our approach is to use an erasure code to encode each message m
broadcast by the source. Upon receiving the codeword each node will only store
a “piece” of the encoded message so that when a node rejoins the network, it will
be able to recover the messages it lost after it encounters a speciﬁed number of
nodes. We note that node mobility is crucial and beneﬁcial in this context since
the more nodes are encountered, the more codeword symbols can be recovered and
the faster a rejoining node will be able to reconstruct the message. Since, clearly,
nodes cannot store every message ever broadcast by the source, we only require
them to store “pieces” for a ﬁnite number of messages.
Preliminaries.
Before describing our reliable message delivery mechanism, we ﬁrst introduce
some basic deﬁnitions. Recall that N is the set of all nodes in the network. At
each time step t ≥ 1, the source S broadcasts a message mt. Let ON(t) ⊆ N and
OFF(t) ⊆ N be the subsets of nodes that were online (i.e., connected) and oﬄine
(i.e., disconnected) at the time when message mt was broadcast, respectively. We
consider the following scenario. A node v ∈ OFF(t) is oﬄine at time t and therefore
misses mt. If at time t
′ > t, v rejoins the network and wishes to recover mt, then
we assume it will begin to encounter other nodes in the network, and in particular
nodes that store symbols of ct.
In addition, let μ be a ﬁnite value that determines for how many time steps each
node in ON(t) will store a “piece”. Intuitively, one can think of μ as determining
the memory of the mechanism, or in other words, the number of time steps over
which the system will guarantee that a message is recoverable. So if v ∈ OFF(t)
rejoins the network at some time t′ > t, then it will only be able to recover mt if
t′ < t + μ.
Let C = (Encode,Decode) be a (λ, , d)-erasure code. We assume that for any
broadcast there are always at least λ nodes online (i.e., for t ≥ 1, |ON(t)| ≥ λ).
For ease of exposition, we also assume all messages have the same length, but note
that our analysis can be easily adapted to the case where messages have diﬀerent
lengths. Our reliable message delivery mechanism works as follows. For all t ≥ 1:
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• S broadcasts ct = Encode(mt) = (st,1, . . . , st,λ).
• each node in ON(t) does the following:
(i) if t > μ then erase st−μ
(ii) store st,y, where y
R
← [1, λ].
• if at time t′ > t, node v ∈ OFF(t) wishes to recover mt, it requests symbols of ct
from its neighbors until it has enough unique symbols to decode and recover mt.
• after recovering mt, v re-encodes it and stores symbol st,y, where y
R
← [1, λ].
Since for each message mt a node is required to store at most one symbol of the
codeword ct, the total storage per node is at most μ symbols.
Recovering a single message.
We now establish the expected number of encounters needed to recover a single
missed message. In order to fully understand the trade-oﬀ (between storage and re-
covery time) that our mechanism provides, we derive this expectation as a function
of the underlying erasure code’s parameters. However, in Section 5 we ﬁx a speciﬁc
code and study the trade-oﬀ more precisely in the context of broadcast encryp-
tion. We note that the underlying model used in our analysis only approximates a
MANET.
Let Store(mt, t
′) ⊆ N be the subset of nodes that store a symbol of ct =
Encode(mt) at time t
′ > t, and let Rec(mt, t
′) = OFF(t)∩Store(mt, t
′) be the subset
of nodes that missed the broadcast of mt (i.e., that were oﬄine at time t), but that
recovered mt by time t
′ > t. So Rec(mt, t
′) includes, for example, any nodes that
missed mt’s original broadcast but that rejoined the network (at some time θ < t
′)
and have already recovered mt by time t
′.
Given a node v ∈ OFF(t) that rejoins the network at time t′ > t and wishes to
recover mt, we want to compute an upper bound on the expected number of nodes
in Store(mt, t
′) that v must encounter in order to recover mt. By deﬁnition,
|Store(mt, t
′)| = |ON(t)|+ |Rec(mt, t
′)| ≥ |ON(t)|.
Since each node in ON(t) selects a symbol of ct = (st,1, . . . , st,λ) uniformly at ran-
dom, then, on average, at time t each symbol will be stored by |ON(t)|
λ
nodes. Fur-
thermore, since each node in ON(t) only stores symbols for messages broadcast in
the last μ time steps, at any time t < t′ < t+μ we know that each symbol of ct will
be stored by at least |ON(t)|
λ
nodes. Or in other words, each symbol will be almost
equally dispersed throughout the network. In addition, since every node in ON(t)
chooses which symbol of ct to store uniformly at random, when encountering a node
in ON(t), v will recover a uniformly distributed symbol of ct. It follows that at any
time t < t′ < t + μ, the number of nodes in Store(mt, t
′) that v must encounter in
order to recover at least λ − d + 1 unique symbols of ct is at most the number of
independent and uniformly distributed samples needed to recover at least λ− d+1
unique elements from a set of λ elements. This reduces to the coupon collector’s
problem [18,17].
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Let X be a random variable deﬁned to be the latter and let Xi, where 0 ≤
i ≤ λ − d, be the random variable deﬁned to be the number of samples needed to
select an element of ct not sampled in any of the previous experiments Xj , where
0 ≤ j ≤ i − 1. It follows that X =
∑λ−d
i=0 Xi, and by the linearity of expectation
E[X] =
∑λ−d
i=0 E[Xi]. Since each Xi is geometrically distributed with parameter
pi =
λ−i
λ
, we have E[Xi] =
1
pi
and
E[X] =
λ−d∑
i=0
λ
λ− i
= λ
λ−d+1∑
i=1
1
λ− i + 1
= λ
λ∑
i=d
1
i
= λ(Hλ −Hd−1),
where Hn denotes the n
th harmonic number. Since Hn ≤ lnn + γ, where γ is a
constant, we have
E[X] ≤ λ (lnλ− ln(d− 1)) ≤ λ ln
(
λ
d− 1
)
≤

ρ
ln
(

ρ · (d− 1)
)
. (1)
So at any time t < t′ < t+μ, on average, v ∈ OFF(t) will need to encounter O( ln )
nodes in Store(mt, t
′) in order to recover mt.
Recovering multiple messages.
We can now establish a (loose) upper bound on the number of encounters needed
to recover multiple messages. Let Δ = (mt1 , . . . ,mtr) be the set of messages missed
by v and let t′ be the time at which v ∈
⋂r
i=1 OFF(ti) rejoins the network. Assuming
t′ < t1 + μ, then we know that all the missed messages are recoverable at time
t′; and that for each message mti , where 1 ≤ i ≤ r, v needs to encounter at
most 
ρ
ln
(

ρ·(d−1)
)
nodes in Store(mti , t
′). Therefore, it follows that v will need to
encounter a total of at most
r ·

ρ
ln
(

ρ · (d− 1)
)
(2)
nodes in
⋃r
i=1 Store(mti , t
′). We note that this bound is not tight and that in practice
the number of encounters will be smaller due to the fact that some nodes will be
online during multiple time steps and, therefore, will store symbols for multiple
messages. Consequently, v may recover symbols for multiple messages from a single
encounter. And this will decrease the total number of encounters needed to recover
the messages in Δ.
5 Reliable Stateful Broadcast Encryption
We now address the problem of secure content distribution in MANETs by using
stateful broadcast encryption provisioned with a reliable message delivery mech-
anism. Stateful broadcast encryption schemes, such as LKH [27,26] or its more
eﬃcient variants [4,5,24], are appealing because of their reduced communication
cost. However, in the context of MANETs it is likely that a node will miss key
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updates due to network partitions or lossy links. To address this, we deliver the key
updates using our reliable message delivery mechanism. This allows us to take ad-
vantage of the reduced communication cost oﬀered by stateful broadcast encryption
schemes in the context of highly dynamic mobile ad hoc wireless networks.
We use our reliable message delivery mechanism instantiated with a (2, , +1)-
erasure code to reliably deliver the broadcast encryption scheme’s key updates to
all the nodes in the network. Here, we consider a broadcast encryption scheme
with key updates of bit length k · log n, where k is the size of the session key,
and n is the number of nodes in the system. Several erasure codes and broadcast
encryption schemes achieve these parameters including, for example, [21,15] and
[4,5,24], respectively.
Recovering a single key update.
From Equation (1) in Section 4, we know that if instantiated with a (2, , +1)-
erasure code our delivery mechanism will guarantee that at any time t < t′ < t+μ,
on average, node v ∈ OFF(t) will have to encounter at most 2 · ln(2) nodes in
Store(mt, t
′) in order to recover the tth key update. If σ is the size of a symbol
(measured in bits), then each node will store μ · σ bits. Furthermore, if k · log(n) is
the size of the key update (also in bits), then  = k·log(n)
σ
and
E[X] ≤
2 · k · log(n) · ln(2)
σ
≤ 1.3863 ·
k · log(n)
σ
,
where X is the random variable deﬁned to be the number of nodes v ∈ OFF(t) needs
to encounter in order to recover the tth key update.
Recovering multiple key updates.
Consider the case where a node v is oﬄine during r revocation events. v will
then miss the following r key updates broadcast by the source: Δ = (mt1 , . . . ,mtr).
Each node will store μ ·σ bits and if t′ < t1+μ then, by Equation (2) in Section 4, v
will need to encounter a total of at most 1.3863· r·k·log(n)
σ
nodes in
⋃r
i=1 Store(mti , t
′).
Remark.
The data stored by non-authorized nodes does not allow them to decrypt the
broadcast content. Consequently, the security of the system holds even if such
non-authorized nodes are compromised.
6 Experimental Results
In this section we evaluate experimentally the performance of our message delivery
mechanism.
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Fig. 1. Time required to encounter a single node
after rejoining, as a function of node density and
node speed.
Fig. 2. Time required to encounter ten nodes after
rejoining, as a function of node density and node
speed.
Setup.
Nodes in the network were conﬁgured to use 802.11 radios with a nominal range
of 250 meters (m). We randomly placed nodes within a 1500 by 1500 square meter
area and varied the node density between 50 and 200 nodes per square kilometer.
We also varied the nodes’ maximum speed between 2 and 20 m/s (note a maximum
speed of 10 m/s corresponds to an average speed of 5 m/s, since speeds are chosen
uniformly between 0 and the maximum speed). Each data point in the ﬁgures of
this section is the average result of 500 diﬀerent random environments.
We used a random way-point mobility model, but incorporated changes to ad-
dress concerns raised in [30] about the validity of the standard random way-point
model. In particular, nodes select a speed uniformly between 10% and 90% of the
given maximum speed to achieve a more steady mobility pattern and ensure that the
average speed does not drop drastically over the course of the simulation. In addi-
tion, 300 seconds of mobility are generated before the start of the simulation so that
nodes are already in motion. This allows the average speed and node distribution
to stabilize before the simulation starts.
Since our mechanism allows one to trade storage per node for the number of
encounters required, we measured the amount of time (in seconds) needed to en-
counter a speciﬁc number of nodes. We conducted two experiments, one to measure
the amount of time needed for a node to encounter a single node, and the other to
measure the amount of time needed to encounter ten nodes. In both experiments,
we identify the nodes that are online at the time a node v gets disconnected. We
then measure the time it takes v to encounter those nodes.
Figures 1 and 2 show the amount of time required for a rejoining node to en-
counter one and ten nodes, respectively. We observe that as the node density
increases, the time required to meet a given number of nodes decreases. The same
holds as the maximum speed of the nodes increases. We note that for high node
densities the time values become very reasonable. In fact, for a network density
of 200 nodes per square kilometer and a low maximum node speed of 5 m/s, the
ﬁrst node is encountered in 8 seconds and the tenth node is encountered after 77
seconds.
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Remark.
During our experiments, we noticed that while a node v is disconnected, the
number of connected nodes typically remains very high. Thus, as noted in Sec-
tion 5, when v rejoins the network, it should be able to recover several symbols
from each encounter. We therefore expect the recovery time for multiple messages
to be relatively close to the recovery time for a single message.
An extension for low node densities.
We have seen that our mechanism achieves the best results when used in net-
works with high node densities. This is due to the fact that a rejoining node recovers
missed messages only through direct encounters with other nodes. We propose the
following modiﬁcation in order to increase the speed of message recovery: when a
rejoining node v encounters the ﬁrst node, it not only recovers symbols from this
node, but asks the node to retrieve other symbols from its own neighbors. The
retrieval of symbols can thus continue recursively in an expanding ring fashion until
node v recovers all the symbols it needs. This will not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the overall
network communication, since the additional traﬃc will be localized in v’s neigh-
borhood. However, by leveraging the network, a rejoining node can greatly reduce
its message recovery time, even for networks with relatively low node densities.
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message size storage size at the receiver key update size
stateful O(1) O(log n) O(log n)
stateless O(r) O(1) not required
Table A.1
Parameters for stateful and stateless broadcast encryption schemes: n is the total number of users in the
system and r is the number of revoked users
A Communication cost comparison for stateful and state-
less broadcast encryption schemes
Let N be the set of users, n = |N| be the total number of users, and r = |R| = n−|G|
be the number of revoked users. We consider the three following parameters of a
broadcast encryption scheme: the size of a broadcast message, the required storage
at the receiver, and the size of a key update (in the case of stateful schemes).
Table A.1 presents the parameters of the most eﬃcient stateful [4,5,24] and stateless
schemes [11,1,10,12] 3 .
We evaluate the overall message transmission cost for both stateful and stateless
schemes. Let us consider a period of time in which r users are revoked and d mes-
sages, each of size l, are broadcast between two consecutive revocations. Note that
when a join or a revocation occur, stateful schemes require the source to broadcast
a key update of size O(k · log n), where k is the size of the session key. Stateless
schemes, on the other hand, do not require such updates and instead add a header
of size O(r) to each subsequent message. The total transmission cost at the source
for a stateful scheme is then O(r · d · l + r · log n · k) bits. For stateless schemes, the
cost is
r−1∑
i=0
m · (l + c · i) = O(r ·m · l + d · r2 · k).
where c is some arbitrary constant.
Thus, when r = Ω(log n), stateful schemes become more eﬃcient in terms of
communication than stateless schemes. This has important practical implications
since, for example, if n = 210 a stateful scheme will become more eﬃcient after
r = 10 revocations. In a dynamic network of 1024 users, it can be easily assumed
that more than 10 users will be revoked.
3 Recently a stateless scheme has been proposed that achieves constant broadcast size [2]. However, we
do not consider it here since its applicability for content distribution in MANETS is limited, as it requires
O(n) storage at the receiver.
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